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\

Plaintiffs and Respondents, )

vs.
EMIL SUHRMANN, d/b/a SUHRMANN'S SOUTH TEMPLE MEAT
COMPANY, and ALBERT NOORDA
and SAM L. GUSS, d/b/a JORDAN
MEAT & LIVESTOCK COMPANY,
and VALLEY SAUSAGE COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,

\.

No.

/

8753

~)

Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an intermediate appeal taken from that certain
order entered in the District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah,
on the lOth day of September, 1957, whereby eleven suits filed
by the plaintiffs against the above-named defendants were
ordered consolidated for trial as to liability only.
3
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Each of the eleven suits claim damages suffered by the
plaintiffs in allegedly contracting trichinosis due to eating a
sausage product known as metwurst which was manufactured,
insofar as mixing the raw ingredients were concerned, by
defendant Valley Sausage Company. The unfinished product,
then in a raw, unsmoked and inedible state, was sold to defendants and distributors, Jordan Meat and Livestock Company, who in turn sold the product to the defendant Emil
Suhrmann. This metwurst was then processed in defendant
Suhrmann' s smoke oven and thereafter sold by Suhrmann to
the plaintiffs as retail purchasers. The complaint filed in each
of the suits is based on negligence of each of the defendants
and on breach of an implied warranty. The answers filed in
the cases by each of the defendants raise issues as to liability,
if any, and there will be sharp conflict in the evidence on these
issues in any trial of these cases as set forth in the pre-trial
order dated September 12, 1957 (R. 19-25).
A motion to amend the pre-trial order was filed by defendants Valley Sausage Company and Jordan Meat & Livestock Company in the lower court on September 27, 1957,
and after hearing arguments thereon, the court again denied
the defendants a right to a trial of the issues of liability and
damages before a single jury (R. 28-32). This intermediate
appeal then was taken (R. 37-43), and thereafter granted by
this Honorable Court (R. 36}.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT
4
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CONSOLIDATING THE CASES AS TO LIABILITY ONLY,
THEREBY LEAVING THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES TO BE
THEREAFTER TRIED SEPARATELY BY A DIFFERENT
JURY IN EACH CASE IS ERRONEOUS, CONTRARY TO
THE LAW, AND IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH.

POINT II
THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT
CONSOLIDATING THE CASES AS TO LIABILITY ONLY
IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANTS AND WOULD
RESULT IN MANIFEST INJUSTICE TO THE DEFENDANTS.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT
CONSOLIDATING THE CASES AS TO LIABILITY ONLY,
THEREBY LEAVING THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES TO BE
THEREAFTER TRIED SEPARATELY BY A DIFFERENT
JURY IN EACH CASE IS ERRONEOUS, CONTRARY TO
THE LAW, AND IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH.
It is the contention of the defendants, and each of them,
that they are entitled to a trial of all of the issues involved
in each of these cases, both as to liability and damages, by a
[ jury consisting of eight ( 8) jurors.

5
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The Constitution of the State of Utah, under Article I,
Section 7, provides as follows:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law."
and Section 10 of Article I further provides:
"In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, except in
capital cases, a jury shall consist of 8 jurors. In courts
of inferior jurisdiction the jury shall consist of 4 jurors.
In criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In
civil cases, three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict.
A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded."
The language used in our Utah State Constitution is clear
in not granting the power to determine the mode of jury trial
to the legislature or the courts but specifically enumerates the
number of jurors to constitute a jury and the number required
to render a verdict. This is clearly indicative that such matters
were not subject to change, alteration or judicial modification
without an amendment to our Constitution. It is to be anticipated that counsel for plaintiffs will argue that in some instances, the Federal Courts have permitted separate trials of
the issues of damages and liability and therefore contend that
there is no violation of any constitutional right. However, it
is respectfully submitted that Amendment VII to the Constitution of the United States provides that the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved but does not designate the number of
jurors to constitute a valid jury nor does it restrict the right
of Congress or the United States Supreme Court to promulgate
rules pertaining to this right of trial by jury, except as to its
substantive provision. Thus a comparison of the language used

6
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by the framers of the two constitutions leaves a clearly defined
conclusion that Congress and the Federal Courts have much
broader powers in promulgating procedural rules with respect
to the mode of jury trial than do the State legislature and the
judiciary of Utah.
We now proceed to a consideration of Title 78-21-1, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, which provides as follows:
"In actions for the recovery of specific real or personal property, with or without damages, or for money
claimed as due upon contract or as damages for breach
of contract, or for injuries, an issue of fact may be
tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived or a reference is ordered."
and Title 78-21-2 then follows:
u All questions of fact, (Italics ours) where the trial
is by jury, other than those mentioned in the next section, are to be decided by the jury (italics ours) and
all evidence thereon is to be addressed to them, except
when otherwise provided."

It is to be observed that the legislature has clearly and
concisely stated in the foregoing statute that all questions of fact
•
are to be decided by the jury which simply means that all issues
of fact should be tried before one jury and after due deliberation, a verdict rendered thereon. Certainly the language of this
statute is not open to a variable interpretation. The statute
does not say that the trial shall be of all issues of fact by
juries, but specifically states, the jury.

I

~
~

~~

Interpretation of the article "the" has been considered
by the courts in many instances. In the case of Rocci vs. Massachusetts Accident Company, 222 Mass. 336, at page 344, 110
7
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NE 972, the court in considering the question of what the word
"the" meant in an insurance policy on a house said:
"Within the (italics ours) house naturally means one
house."
And in the case of Howell vs. State, 164 Ga. 204, page 210,
138 SE 206, the court stated:
"It is true that the word 'the' is the definite article
and is the word generally used before nouns with particularizing effect, and as opposed to the indefinite articles
·a' or ·an', and to the generalizing effect of the latter
articles. The former particularizes the subject spoken
of. It is a demonstrative word used especially before
a noun to particularize its meaning."

Thus the language used in the Utah statute (Title 78-21-2)
does not sanction the trial of some of the issues triable by jury
before one jury, while the remaining issues are withheld from
its consideration and thereafter submitted for trial by another
jury. The parties may waive this right but in absence of a consent and waiver, the right to a trial of all of the issues of fact,
both as to liability and damages, by one jury is substantive and
must remain inviolate.
This right is preserved by the provisions of Rule 38 (a)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provides as follows:
"Right Preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by the Constitution or as given by statute shall
be preserved to the parties." (Italics ours.)
This procedural rule thus dictates that the right of trial
by jury and the method prescribed by the Constitution of Utah
and by our State statutes should be preserved inviolate and not
in any manner altered by the Rules of Civil Procedure.
8
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Rule 42 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for separate t~ials in certain situations as follows:
"Separate Trials. The court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a separate
trial of any claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or thirdparty claim, or of any separate issue or of any number
of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party
claims, or issues."

1

Applying the language of this rule to our instant cases,
we respectfully submit that the order of consolidation for trial
of the cases as to liability only would certainly not result in
any convenience to the trial court or to the parties involved,
but to the contrary, would result in great inconvenience to
all concerned. In the event liability was determined adversely
to the defendants, it would then become necessary to summon
an additional jury or juries for consideration of damages
and this would obviously be prejudicial to the defendants, and
each of them, particularly where there will exist a sharp
conflict in the evidence as to liability, if any, of each of the
defendants.

It goes without saying that piecemeal trials are objectionable and in instances where the issues of liability are so in~ separably interwoven with the issues of damages that they
cannot be judiciously and properly tried separately without
prejudice to one or some of the parties, then the trial court
certainly abuses its discretion in ordering separate trials of
the issues of liability and damages. Such procedure will irreparably prejudice the rights of the parties and in effect denies
,[, to them the right to a fair trial by a jury as known at the
common law and under the American system of jurisprudence.

9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In support thereof, defendants cite the case of Y azzo M. V.R.
vs. Scott, 110 Miss. 443, 67 So. 491, wherein the court said:
"An examination of the English decisions will disclose that those courts, have generally, thoug~ not
always, declined to limit the issues when ~~ardmg a
new trial. The ground upon which the deos10n seems
to proceed is that the verdict of a jury is indivisible,
and the judgment rendered thereon is an entirety, must
in all cases be dealt with as such."
Also, in the case of Donnaton vs. Union Hardware and Metal
Company, 175 P 26, 38 Cal. App. 8, wherein the court, discussing the question of limiting a new trial to the issue of damages
only, said:
"It would work a grave injustice upon the defendant
to force it to a new trial of the issue as to damages
only, with the issue as to liability, upon which no
verdict other than in name had been rendered, forever
closed against any inquiry. An examination of all the
evidence relating to the injury and its cause and the
conduct of the plaintiff, as well as the defendant's
agents, might show that it is so interwoven with that
relating to damages that to fairly ascertain what is just
compensation the plaintiff should receive, if he is entitled to recover at all, can best be determined by trying
the whole case before one judge and one jury instead of
splitting it up between different judges and different
juries."

This proposition of submitting only a part of the facts
triable by a jury, to a jury without consent of the parties, was
considered in the case of Slocum vs. New York Life Insut'ance
Company, 228 U.S. 364, wherein the Supreme Court of the
United States speaking through Mr. Justice Van Devanter, and
quoting from the case of Ba1'ney vs. Scl:mzeider, 9 U.S. 248, said:
10
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"As the defendant in this case did not waive his
right to have the facts tried by a jury, it was the duty
of the court to submit such facts to the jury that was
sworn to try them. It is needles§ to say that this was
not done. The statement is clear that the case was
decided upon the testimony taken at a former trial,
and not read before this jury, because the court had
heard it in the first case, and did not deem it necessary
to be heard by the jury in this case.
"It is possible to have a jury trial in which the plaintiff, having failed to offer any evidence at all, or any
competent evidence, the jury finds for the defendant
for that very reason. And in such case it is strictly
correct, if the plaintiff does not take a non-suit, for the
court to instruct the jury to find for the defendant.
But we have never before heard of a case in which
the jury were permitted, much less instructed, to find
a verdict for the plaintiff on evidence of which they
knew nothing except what is detailed to them in the
charge of the court. It is obvious that if such a verdict
can be supported here, when the very act of the court
in doing this is excepted to and relied on as error, the
trial by jury may be preserved in name, but will be
destroyed in its essential value, and become nothing
but the machinery through which the court exercises
the functions of a jury without its responsibility."
(Italics ours.)
Mr. Justice Van Devanter then citing the case of Hodges
vs. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, and others, at pages 387 and 388 of
the opinion, concludes:
"They show that it is the province of the jury to
hear the evidence and by their verdict to settle the
issues of fact, no matter what the state of the evidence;
. . . in other words the constitutional guaranty operates to require that the issues be settled by the verdict
of a jury, unless the right thereto be waived."
11
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The argument may be suggested that because of the
numerous parties involved in the consolidation of the cases,
that such procedure would necessarily impose a substantial
burden upon the jury in determining the issues of damages, in
the event the jury found adversely to the defendants, or either
of them, on liability. This argument is of little merit because
many cases submitted for a jury trial may only have one party
plaintiff and one party defendant but the case may involve
many witnesses, have numerous exhibits introduced into evidence, and be extremely complicated in nature and troublesome
to the jury in arriving at a determination of the issues. Certainly this situation would not justify the impaneling of several
juries to try the issues of liability and then have another jury
impaneled to determine the issue of damages. It is conceded
that in certain given situations the Federal Courts have submitted the determination of the issue of liability to one jury,
but it should be noted that in those situations where this procedure has been followed, the facts clearly indicated that the
issue of damages was ordinarily one of property damage in
which the amount could easily be ascertained and without
prejudice to the fundamental rights of the parties. There are
also some cases where separate issues have been tried by separate
juries but in those situations, the issues were on questions collateral to the main issue of liability. No prejudice of basic rights
result where that is done.
It is basic that the verdict of a jury is indivisible and that
the award of damages is more often than not tempered by the
sound discretion of the jury after hearing all of the facts regard·
ing liability. This is the fundamental strength of reason in

12
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the right to a jury trial and the vitality of our American system
of jurisprudence.

POINT II
THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT
CONSOLIDATING THE CASES AS TO LIABILITY ONLY
IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANTS AND WOULD
RESULT IN MANIFEST INJUSTICE TO THE DEFENDANTS.
The defendants are. not opposed to a trial of these eleven
cases either upon an individual basis, or by groups of a given
number of plaintiffs, or all of them consolidated, so long as
in any method of procedure, the same jury considers the issues
of liability and thereafter assess the damages, if need be, as to
one or more of the defendants. As has been previously said. to
do otherwise and as ordered by the trial court at pretrial,
would result in manifest injustice to the defendants and be
prejudicial to their right to an impartial trial by jury. The
consolidation for trial of all of the cases before one court
and jury, trying all the issues involved, both as to liability and
damages, would not create an extraordinary burden upon the
court or the jury, but to the contrary, would logically expedite
: a judicial determination of all the issues. As was said by the
court in the case of United States ex rel Rodriquez vs. Weekly
· Publications, Incorporated, 9 Fed. Rules Decisions, page 179, 13
Fed. Rules Service at page 769:
1

"In support of his motion, the plaintiff asserts that
whereas the issues of liability are simple and can be
quickly disposed of by a jury, the issues of damages
13
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are exceedingly complicated and will undoubtedly require the services of a master. In substance, h?wever,
the plaintiff wants two jury trials, one to const~er the
question of liability and the othe~ to ~scer_tat~ the
damages . . . The gravamen of thts act~on ts aaud.
An indispensible element of a cause of actiOn for fraud
is damages. In other words, fraud in the abstract does
not give rise to a claim. It is only fraud causilly connected to damage which is the basis of an action. In the
instant case, the segregation of the issues of liability
and damages and their trial to two separate juries
would mean that the first jury would be confronted
with the question of fraud in the abstract without the
necessary connection to specific damages and the second
jury would be confronted with the issues of damages
without having before it the links which unite them
to the fraud. That this is the danger to which such a
severance would expose this litigation is made clear by
the very suggestion of the plaintiff's counsel . . . This
is not a separate defense, such as the statute of frauds
or release, or the statute of limitations, which may be
separately adjudicated without in any way interfering
with the trial of the remaining issues . . . In a cause
of action for fraud, tried to a jury, this severability
does not appear to be feasible."
The above court then denied plaintiffs motion for separate
trials of the issues of fraud and damages because of the obvious
prejudicial effect to the defendant. This same problem was
considered in the case of Eichinger z·s. Firemans Fund Insurance
Company, 20 Fed. Rules Decisions, page 204, 23 Fed. Rules
Service, at page 526, wherein the court said:
"As a preliminary reflection, it may well be recog·
nized that within the thought of the rules as a whole,
and as . a proce~ural charter, there is an impalpable
suggestiOn that, m default of controlling considerations

14
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to the contrary, a single submission of all of the issues
in a civil action should be favored rather than their
resolution in piecemeal trials . . . It is also asserted,
not wholly without force, that the issues as against the
separate groups of defendants are of such character
that they may not be presented to a single jury with
a degree of clarity adequate to their intelligent comprehension and answer. That the case does confront
the trial judge with a task of sobering magnitude and
delicacy, the court unhesitatingly grants. It also imposes
a heavy burden of discrimination in advocacy upon
the attorneys by whom it will be tried. But the court
is convinced that neither the duty of the trial judg~
nor that of counsel is necessarily, or reasonably, beyond intelligible performance in the exercise of the
care requisite for it. Impossibility of such performance
certainly would require that there be separate trials.
Difficulty of execution, however austere, if short of
practical impossibility, should not. Both judge and
counsel may prefer becomingly to avoid the performance of notably difficult assignments. Neither should
evade them by cowardly flight."
It is thus to be observed that courts are reluctant in permitting cases to be tried in piecemeal fashion, and rightly so,
for the obvious reason that prejudice will result in most in: stances and the parties involved in the litigation be unlawfully
· deprived of their basic rights to a determination of the issues
i by a jury of their own peers. This doesn't mean a consideration
' by one or more juries; the right simply means that a person
·should have the fundamental assurance that a jury who is to
hold him liable and thereafter assess damages, if need be, shall
only do so after a careful consideration of all of the facts both
ias to those of liability and damages. To do otherwise, would
~~be to invade our American jury system and effectively destroy
1

15
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its fundamental concepts which have endured over the centuries.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion and by way of summary, it is the contention
of the appellants that the trial court abused its discretion in
making and entering its order consolidating all of these cases
for trial as to liability only. We respectfully reiterate that
such procedure is erroneous and unconstitutional, prejudicial
to the fundamental rights of each of the appellants herein, and
would result in manifest injustice.
Respectfully submitted,
HURD, BAYLE & HURD
GRANT MACFARLANE
and WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR
Attorneys for Defendants and
Appellants
1105 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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